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In his company￿ s annual report for 2001, Amazon.com founder and CEO Je⁄rey
Bezos begins his letter to shareholders as follows:
￿In July of last year, Amazon.com reached an important way sta-
tion. After four years of single-minded focus on growth, and then
just under two years spent almost exclusively on lowering costs, we
reached a point where we could a⁄ord to balance growth and cost
improvement, dedicating resources and sta⁄ed projects to both.￿
As this statement suggests, many ￿rms face a fundamental strategic tradeo⁄:
they can focus their e⁄orts on increasing sales growth, or on improving pro￿t
margins (e.g., by lowering unit costs), but given limits on managerial time and
other resources, doing more on one dimension necessarily implies doing less on
the other. In other words, the choice of whether to emphasize growth or margins
is essentially a multi-tasking problem of the sort envisioned by, e.g., Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1991).
In this paper, we study the implications of this multi-tasking problem for
the dynamics of ￿rm behavior. We are particularly interested in the interplay
between ￿rms￿strategies and the way that the stock market goes about eval-
uating them. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, just as a ￿rm can change its
strategic orientation over time, so too can investors shift the emphasis that they
place on various performance measures. In the speci￿c case of Amazon.com,
Hong and Stein (2004) provide a detailed reading of equity analysts￿reports, and
document that, during the period that Bezos calls the growth phase (roughly
through the end of 1999), analysts were almost uniformly focused on growth-
related metrics in valuing Amazon stock, to the virtual exclusion of pro￿tability
or cost-related metrics.1 Conversely, during the cost-cutting phase that followed,
analysts began to pay much more attention to per-unit measures of costs and
pro￿ts.2
One interpretation of the Amazon story is that managers actively cater to
the stock market￿ s preferences in choosing their strategies. That is, when the
market is more interested in growth than pro￿t margins, managers like Bezos
give the market what it wants, by focusing their e⁄orts on delivering increased
revenue growth. And when the market changes to being more interested in
margins, managers take the cue and adapt their strategies accordingly. Cer-
tainly, if one thinks of the market￿ s valuation model as exogenously given, it
would seem to make sense for a manager interested in maximizing her ￿rm￿ s
current stock price to cater in this fashion.
1For example, in a February 1999 report lauding Amazon￿ s growth prospects, Scott Ehrens
of Bear Stearns writes that: ￿In traditional o⁄-line retail, the gross margin is a very important
metric to watch...This is not the case in the on-line world..￿
2In a March 2001 report on Amazon, Holly Becker of Lehman Brothers argues: ￿It is now
clear that higher customer churn rates, weak shipping margins and equally high marketing
spend will o⁄set many of the company￿ s virtues...we recommend investors stay on the side-
lines...Clearly, the company will need to increase gross margins...￿
1Alternatively, one might read the Amazon story as saying that ￿rms￿strate-
gies drive the market￿ s valuation model, not the other way around. And again,
it would seem perfectly rational for investors to pay more attention to a ￿rm￿ s
growth numbers if they know that management is devoting most of its e⁄ort to
generating growth.3
We take the view that the causality runs in both directions. In our model,
managers interested in their stock prices do indeed cater to the market, but at
the same time, the market￿ s valuation model rationally takes into consideration
what it perceives to be a ￿rm￿ s current business strategy. This two-way feedback
can produce a variety of interesting e⁄ects. Perhaps most notably, it can lead
to autonomous ￿ uctuations in output growth, even absent any external source
of shocks.
The ￿rst step in understanding how these ￿ uctuations arise is to note that
in a static setting, the two-way feedback can generate multiple equilibria when
parameter values are in an ￿intermediate￿ range such that neither a growth-
oriented nor a margins-oriented strategy represents too extreme a deviation
from ￿rst-best e¢ ciency. For example, if the market conjectures that the ￿rm
is pursuing a growth strategy, its valuation will tend to put more weight on
realized growth, which will in turn encourage the manager to stick with the
growth strategy, so long as this is not too ine¢ cient. On the other hand,
if the market conjectures that the ￿rm is pursuing a cost-cutting strategy, its
valuation will tend to emphasize margins, which will reward the manager for
staying with the cost-cutting strategy.
Now consider the dynamics. Imagine a ￿rm that starts out endowed with
such attractive growth prospects that, irrespective of the market￿ s conjecture,
the optimal choice is for it to pursue a growth strategy. This puts us initially
in the growth equilibrium, in which the market price is especially sensitive to
performance on the growth dimension. Now over time, as it penetrates the
market more fully, the ￿rm will begin to ￿nd the growth strategy less attractive.
More speci￿cally, it will eventually reach a point where, if it were only interested
in choosing the ￿rst-best action, it would start shifting resources away from the
growth strategy, and toward the margins strategy. But here is where things get
di¢ cult. For as long as the market continues to value it as a growth ￿rm, any
change in strategy will lead it to disappoint the market on the growth dimension,
thereby damaging its stock price. Thus if it cares about pleasing the market,
the ￿rm will be trapped into continuing with the growth strategy longer than
is optimal, instead of attending to cost-cutting, as it should.
Eventually, the market will become so saturated, and the growth strategy so
ine¢ cient, that the ￿rm will have no choice but to switch to a margins strategy.
However, relative to the ￿rst-best, this shift will not only come too late, it will
be too abrupt. Much like Bezos￿description of Amazon post-1999, the ￿rm
will go to the other extreme of focusing exclusively on cost-cutting, as opposed
3As Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) argue, and as we develop in more detail be-
low, this is a natural feature of the sort of learning model introduced by Holmstrom (1999).
Intuitively, investors can learn more about a manager￿ s general ability by looking at those
performance measures that she is most actively trying to maximize.
2to taking a balanced approach of devoting some resources to each of the two
strategies. This lack of balance in turn sets the stage for another round of
￿ uctuations. Once entrenched in the margins equilibrium, with the market
now expecting strong performance on the margins dimension, the ￿rm will for
too long pay insu¢ cient attention to growth opportunities, and will eventually
get to a point where it is forced to go back to the growth strategy, at which
point the whole process begins again.
The bottom line is that unlike in the ￿rst best￿ where the ￿rm responds
to a smooth decline in its growth prospects by gradually and monotonically
shifting resources away from a growth strategy and towards a margins strategy￿
adjustment in a world where managers cater to the market involves a series of
sharp oscillations. The ￿rm may go from an all-growth strategy, to an all-
margins strategy, then back again to an all-growth strategy, before eventually
settling down. Central to this result is the premise that managers care to
some degree about maximizing their current stock price, as opposed to just the
present value of future cash￿ ows. Indeed, the more intensely a manager cares
about the current stock price, the more dramatic are the associated ￿ uctuations.
The idea that the stock market can lead to excessive volatility in investment
and output is a venerable one, going back at least to Keynes (1936). More
recent treatments of this idea have tended to emphasize the role of irrational
noise traders, who create exogenous deviations of stock prices from fundamen-
tals. The question then typically asked is to what extent these mispricings
in￿ uence corporate investment, either at the micro or macro level.4 Our ap-
proach in this paper is quite di⁄erent. In most of our analysis, we model the
market as fully rational, albeit imperfectly informed about managerial ability.5
Moreover, beyond this uncertainty about ability, we introduce no further exoge-
nous sources of variation￿ i.e., there is no analog in our setting to noise-trader-
induced sentiment shocks. Thus the real-side volatility in our model is driven
by intrinsic forces, and changes over time in the market￿ s approach to valuation
are completely endogenized. As we argue in detail below, this leads to a novel
set of empirical implications.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we in-
troduce a static version of our model. This static version leaves a lot out; in
particular, it takes the demand for a ￿rm￿ s products to be exogenous. However,
it helps to develop the basic intuition for how multiple equilibria can arise in
our setting. In Section 3, we study dynamics. In so doing, we endogenize
the demand curve facing the ￿rm at any point in time, via a market saturation
mechanism of the sort alluded to above￿ i.e., when the ￿rm plays the growth
strategy for several periods in a row, this reduces the stock of unsatiated cus-
4See, e.g., Bosworth (1975), Fischer and Merton (1984), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990),
Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993), Stein (1996), Chirinko and Schaller (2001), Baker, Stein
and Wurgler (2003), Polk and Sapienza (2004), and Gilchrist, Himmelberg and Huberman
(2004).
5In contrast to our theory, most papers that assume a rational, information-aggregating
stock market have tended to come to positive conclusions regarding its consequences for eco-
nomic e¢ ciency. See for example Holmstrom and Tirole (1993).
3tomers and hence shrinks demand going forward. In Section 4, we ￿ esh out
the model￿ s most distinctive empirical implications. Section 5 discusses related
work, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Static Model
2.1 Technology and information structure
To build intuition and lay the groundwork for our dynamic model, we begin
with a very simple static setup. We consider a ￿rm that produces for two
periods. In the ￿rst period, the ￿rm￿ s manager must decide how to allocate
her e⁄ort between two business strategies: (i) a ￿growth￿strategy of expanding
production and sales; and (ii) a ￿margins￿strategy of maintaining sales while
improving pro￿t margins (say by reducing unit costs). Following Holmstrom
(1999), we assume that the manager￿ s ability is initially unknown to both the
manager herself and the market. However, it is inferred by the market at the
end of the ￿rst period, based on the ￿rm￿ s performance at this time. Managerial
ability is captured by a parameter a which is normally distributed with mean
A and variance va:
The ￿rm￿ s ￿rst-period pro￿t is the sum of two components, a sales-volume
component s0 and a margins component m0:
6 Thus:
￿0 = s0 + m0; (1)
where s0 and m0 depend on both managerial ability, as well as on the manager￿ s
allocation of e⁄ort.
The manager is endowed with one unit of e⁄ort, a fraction e of which is
devoted to the growth strategy of increasing s0 and the remaining (1 ￿ e) of
which is devoted to improving margins m0. The manager chooses e⁄ort so
as to maximize her expected utility U; which we take to be equal to a linear
combination of current pro￿ts and the ￿rm￿ s stock price:7
U = E(￿0 + ￿P0); (2)
where the stock price P0 is equivalent to the market￿ s discounted expectation of
future (i.e., second-period) pro￿ts as of the end of the ￿rst period. As will be-
come clear shortly, this expectation will depend in part on the market￿ s updated
assessment of managerial ability.
We assume the following technologies for generating ￿rst-period sales and
margins respectively:
s0 = aeq0 + "s; (3)
6Naturally, it would be more realistic to write pro￿ts as the product of sales and a pro￿t
margin, rather than as the sum. While such a multiplicative formulation is a bit more
cumbersome than our additive simpli￿cation, it leads to all the same basic results.
7This sort of managerial utility function appears in a number of previous papers, including,
e.g., Miller and Rock (1985), and Stein (1989).
4and
m0 = a(1 ￿ e) + "m; (4)
where: (i) q0 denotes the size of the market, which for the time being we take
to be exogenously ￿xed (an assumption we will relax in the next section when
we analyze the dynamics of the model); (ii) "s is a random variable which
captures sales shocks, and is normally distributed with mean zero and variance
vs; and (iii) "m is a random variable which captures margins shocks, is normally
distributed with mean zero and variance vm, and is independent of "s.
The technologies for sales and margins embody two key assumptions. First,
ability and e⁄ort are complements when it comes to improving either aspect
of performance. As emphasized by Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999),
this implies that one learns more about an agent￿ s ability by looking at her
performance on the dimension on which she is working the hardest.8 Second,
there is an asymmetry across the two tasks: both managerial e⁄ort and ability
have a higher marginal product in terms of increasing sales when the size of the
market q0 is larger, but their impact on margins is independent of market size.
This means that, insofar as the manager is interested in maximizing current
pro￿ts, she will be more inclined to devote her e⁄orts to the growth strategy
when q0 increases.
In the second period, we assume that the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts are given by:
￿1 = a + ￿("s + "m); (5)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) measures the persistence of the sales and margin shocks over
time. Thus not only do the sales and margins shocks partially carry over from
one period to the next, but the ￿rm is also better o⁄ in the second period, all
else equal, with a higher-ability manager.
The timing of actions within the ￿rst period is as follows. First, the manager
chooses an allocation of e⁄ort. Second, sales and margins are realized and pub-
licly observed. Third, the market updates its forecast of second-period pro￿ts,
based on the observed values of sales and margins, and its prior conjecture as to
how the manager allocates e⁄ort. This in turn determines the ￿rst-period stock
price P0. Recall that the stock price is simply the discounted expectation of
second-period pro￿ts, which implies that:
P0 = ￿E(￿1js0;m0;e￿); (6)
where e￿ is the allocation of managerial e⁄ort that the market conjectures, and
￿ is the market￿ s discount factor between the ￿rst and second periods.
2.2 First best
The natural benchmark is the case in which the manager has no incentive to
distort her e⁄ort allocation in order to impress the market. This case arises
8To take a canonical example: a high-school student￿ s inability to speak French can only say
something negative about her broader capabilities if she has been enrolled in French classes;
if she has been studying Spanish instead, no inference can be drawn.
5when either the manager￿ s ability a is public information ex ante (i.e., when
va = 0), or when the manager does not care about the stock price (i.e., when
￿ = 0). If either of these conditions holds, the manager will simply choose e so
as to maximize expected ￿rst-period pro￿ts:
max
e
fE(￿0) = aeq0 + a(1 ￿ e)g: (7)
It then immediately follows that the static ￿rst-best is to set e = 1 (i.e., to
pursue a growth strategy) if q0 > 1 and to set e = 0 (i.e., to pursue a margins
strategy) if q0 < 1. Again, the intuition for this result is that the marginal
return on e⁄ort devoted to the growth strategy is greater when the size of the
market q0 is larger.
2.3 The interaction between the ￿rm and the market
To solve the model in the more general case in which the manager does try
to in￿ uence the market￿ s perceptions, we proceed as follows. We begin by
endowing the market with a particular conjecture about managerial actions (e.g.,
the market might conjecture that the manager is pursuing a growth strategy).
Given this conjecture, we can solve for market prices as a function of the ￿rm￿ s
observed performance on the growth and margins dimensions. Then we take
the manager￿ s perspective and ask what strategy she will prefer to follow, in
light of the market pricing rule. In a rational expectations equilibrium, the
manager￿ s optimal strategy coincides with the market￿ s conjecture. In other
words, an equilibrium is a pair (e;e￿) such that: (i) anticipating the market
conjecture e￿; the manager chooses an e⁄ort allocation e; and (ii) e con￿rms the
market conjecture, namely: e = e￿:
2.3.1 Stock prices
Suppose ￿rst that the market conjectures that the ￿rm is pursuing a growth
strategy (e￿ = 1). Then, based on the observed realizations of s0 and m0;
Bayesian updating leads to the following pricing rule for the ￿rm￿ s stock:
P
g
0 = ￿E (￿1js0;m0;e￿ = 1) (8)
= ￿(A + ￿
sg (s0 ￿ Aq0) + ￿
mgm0);
where, using the fact that the two variables s0 and m0 are uncorrelated, we have
that:
￿
sg = cov (￿1;s0je￿ = 1)=var(s0je￿ = 1) = (q0va + ￿vs)=
￿
q2
0va + vs￿
(9)
and
￿
mg = cov (￿1;m0je￿ = 1)=var(m0je￿ = 1) = ￿: (10)
Similarly, suppose that the market conjectures that the ￿rm is pursuing a
margins strategy (e￿ = 0). Then, based on the observed realizations of s0 and
6m0; Bayesian updating leads to the following pricing rule:
Pm
0 = ￿E (￿1js0;m0;e￿ = 0) (11)
= ￿(A + ￿
sms0 + ￿
mm (m0 ￿ A));
where
￿
sm = cov (￿1;s0je￿ = 0)=var(s0je￿ = 0) = ￿ (12)
and
￿
mm = cov(￿1;m0je￿ = 0)=var(m0je￿ = 0) = (va + ￿vm)=(va + vm): (13)
A couple of features of these pricing rules should be emphasized. First, we
have that ￿
mm > ￿
sm. In other words, when the market thinks the manager
is playing the margins strategy, it puts more weight on margins than on sales.
This makes intuitive sense: when the manager is actively trying to improve
margins, the realization of m0 is more informative about her ability, and hence
about future pro￿ts, than is the realization of s0. Second, if ￿q0 < 1; (which
will always be satis￿ed in a neighborhood around q0 = 1, given that ￿ < 1), then
￿
sg > ￿
mg, which means that when the market thinks the manager is playing
the growth strategy, it puts more weight on sales than on margins. These
inequalities suggest the possibility of multiple equilibria, in which the manager
may cater to the market￿ s beliefs. For example, if the market believes that
the manager is playing a margins strategy, the pricing rule will tend to reward
strong performance on the margins dimension more, which will, all else equal,
make the margins strategy more attractive to the manager.
2.3.2 The potential for multiple equilibria
We are now ready to construct the equilibria of the game between the manager
and the market. This involves postulating a market conjecture, e￿ 2 f0;1g;
then, using the updating rules derived above, computing the expected payo⁄ to
the manager under alternative e⁄ort allocations; and from there deriving the
necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which e = e￿ is indeed the optimal
strategy for the ￿rm manager.
Suppose ￿rst that the market conjectures that the manager is following the
growth strategy e￿ = 1. Then, if the manager chooses to be consistent with the
market conjecture by in fact pursuing the growth strategy (e = 1), her expected
sales, pro￿ts and margins are respectively equal to:
E(s0je = 1) = Aq0 = E(￿0je = 1);E(m0je = 1) = 0; (14)
Therefore, from our analysis in the previous subsection, her expectation of the
resulting stock price is equal to:
E(P
g
0 je = 1) = ￿(A + ￿
sgE(s0 ￿ Aq0je = 1) + ￿
mgE(m0je = 1)) = ￿A: (15)
7Thus by choosing a growth strategy in the face of a growth conjecture, the
manager obtains a total utility payo⁄ equal to:
E(￿0 + ￿P
g
0 je = 1) = Aq0 + ￿￿A: (16)
Now, if the manager instead chooses to go against the market conjecture by
focusing on margins (e = 0), her expected margins, pro￿ts and sales are equal
to:
E(m0je = 0) = A = E(￿0je = 0);E(s0je = 0) = 0; (17)
and her expectation of the resulting stock price is equal to:
E(P
g
0 je = 0) = ￿(A + ￿
sgE(s0 ￿ Aq0je = 0) + ￿
mgE(m0je = 0))
= ￿(A ￿ ￿
sgAq0 + ￿
mgA): (18)
Thus, by choosing a margins strategy in the face of a growth conjecture, the
manager obtains a total utility payo⁄ equal to:
E(￿0 + ￿P
g
0 je = 0) = A + ￿￿(A ￿ ￿
sgAq0 + ￿
mgA): (19)
Comparing equations (16) and (19), we see that by deviating away from the
market conjecture, the manager generates sales that are below expectations by
an average amount Aq0; and margins that are above expectations by an average
amount A; the former translates into a loss in reputation and hence in the stock
price, while the latter translates into a gain. Overall, the manager will choose
to ful￿ll the market￿ s conjecture by choosing e = 1 whenever:
q0 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿(￿
sgq0 ￿ ￿
mg): (20)
Thus for su¢ ciently large market capacity q0, it will always be an equilibrium
for the manager to play the growth strategy. Denote by q￿ the value of q0 that
satis￿es the above constraint with equality. Using the expressions for ￿
sg and
￿
mg derived above, one can analyze how the cut-o⁄ point q￿ varies with the
parameters of the model. In particular, note that q￿ solves:
q ￿ ￿￿￿ = 1 ￿ ￿￿
q2￿a + ￿q￿s
q2￿a + ￿s : (21)
Using this fact, one can show that q￿ is a decreasing function of both ability-
uncertainty, ￿a, and the intensity of the manager￿ s concern for the stock price,
￿. If either of these parameters goes to zero, it is easy to see that q￿goes to
one. That is, we converge to the ￿rst-best situation, where the growth strategy
is only played if q0 ￿ 1:
Applying similar reasoning, we can derive the conditions under which the
margins strategy is an equilibrium. Suppose the market conjectures that the
manager is playing a margins strategy. Then the expected utility to the manager
from going along with the market and playing the margins strategy is equal to:
E(￿0 + ￿Pm
0 je = 0) = A + ￿￿A: (22)
8On the other hand, if the manager deviates from the market conjecture and
chooses a growth strategy, her expected utility is equal to:
E(￿0 + ￿Pm
0 je = 1) = Aq0 + ￿￿(A + ￿
smAq0 ￿ ￿
mmA): (23)
By deviating from the market￿ s conjecture, the manager reduces margins below
expectations by an average amount A, whereas she raises sales above expecta-
tions by an average amount Aq0: The manager will choose to conform with the
market￿ s expectation and emphasize margins whenever
q0 ￿ 1 + ￿￿(￿
mm ￿ ￿
smq0): (24)
Denote by q+ the value of q0 for which condition (24) holds with equality.
Or equivalently call q+ the solution to:
q + ￿￿￿q = 1 + ￿￿
￿a + ￿￿m
￿a + ￿m : (25)
Once again, it is straightforward to show that q+ is an increasing function of
both ￿a and ￿: Moreover, we have:
q+ > 1 > q￿; (26)
when ￿a and ￿ are both strictly positive, whereas
q+ = 1 = q￿ (27)
in the ￿rst best case where at least one of ￿a and ￿ is equal to zero.
Our analysis of the static model is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose that ￿ and ￿a are both strictly positive. Then, there
exist two cut-o⁄ values q￿ and q+ such that: (i) q+ > 1 > q￿; (ii) if q0 < q￿ ,
the unique equilibrium is that the ￿rm plays the margins strategy (e = 0); (iii)
if q0 > q+ , the unique equilibrium is that the ￿rm plays the growth strategy
(e = 1); (iv) if q￿ ￿ q0 ￿ q+, there are two equilibria, one where the ￿rm plays
margins and the other where the ￿rm plays growth. The size of this multiple-
equilibrium region increases with ￿ or ￿a; but it vanishes as ￿ or ￿a converge
to zero, in which case the ￿rm always plays the ￿rst-best strategy.
Again, the economic intuition behind the proposition is one of managers
catering to the stock market￿ s beliefs. If the market perceives that a ￿rm is
trying hard to generate sales growth, it will tend to react more strongly to news
about growth, because such news is more informative about managerial ability.
In contrast, if the market thinks that the ￿rm is focusing its e⁄orts on improving
margins, it will tend to react more strongly to news about pro￿tability. In either
case, a manager who is concerned about stock prices will tend to give the market
what it is looking for, which creates the scope for multiple equilibria. And the
more intense the manager￿ s concern with stock prices, the wider the range of
parameters under which multiple equilibria arise.
93 Dynamics
In the static analysis, we took the market size q0 to be exogenously ￿xed. Now
we consider the case where q varies endogenously over time, in response to ￿rms￿
past strategic choices. In particular, we assume that the longer a ￿rm pursues
a growth strategy, the more it exhausts the potential pool of customers for its
products, and hence the lower is demand going forward. This formulation yields
a system with its own internal dynamics, and allows us to ask, e.g., how the
volatility of sales growth depends on the various parameters of the model.
3.1 The evolution of demand
Imagine an in￿nite-horizon economy in which, at each date t, qt denotes the
per-￿rm unful￿lled demand for a durable good which is produced by many
identical ￿rms. This demand comes from a unit mass of consumers with un￿lled
orders. Every period, a fraction ￿ of these consumers die, and are replaced
by new consumers with individual orders of Qt: These births and deaths lead
to di⁄erent dynamic equations for qt depending upon whether ￿rm managers
choose a growth versus a margins strategy. More speci￿cally, the dynamics of
un￿lled orders qt can be described as follows.
In the growth regime, there are per-￿rm sales of Aqt, leaving un￿lled or-
ders of (1 ￿ A)qt at the end of period t:9 Before the next period, a fraction
￿ of consumers with un￿lled orders die, so the carryover into period t + 1 is
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ A)qt. In addition, a fraction ￿ of new consumers are born, with
orders of Qt. So if the growth regime prevails at time t, we have:
qt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ A)qt + ￿Qt: (28)
In the margins regime, everything is the same, except that per-￿rm sales at
time t are 0. So if the margins regime prevails at time t, we have:
qt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)qt + ￿Qt: (29)
More generally, if managers choose to allocate an interior level of e⁄ort et
to the growth strategy￿ so that we are in neither the pure growth nor the pure
margins regime￿ we have:
qt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ Aet)qt + ￿Qt: (30)
These equations fully characterize the evolution of demand from one period to
the next. Again, the key point to note is that if we are in the growth regime at
time t, this leads to lower demand at time t + 1, since the representative ￿rm
produces more and hence satis￿es a greater fraction of the un￿lled orders.
9We assume that there are many identical ￿rms selling to the same pool of customers,
so that we can ignore the e⁄ect of ￿rm-level shocks to sales and managerial ability on the
aggregate dynamics of un￿lled orders. In other words, these ￿rm-level shocks wash out across
the many ￿rms in the industry.
103.2 Information structure
With respect to incentives and information structure, we try to stick as closely
as possible to the assumptions of the static model. Firms are run by a succession
of one-period managers. The manager who is in charge at time t has ability at,
and a utility function given by:
Ut = Et(￿t + ￿Pt): (31)
Here ￿t denotes time-t pro￿ts, and Pt is the time-t market value of the ￿rm.
That is:
Pt = Et
X
k￿1
￿
k￿t+k; (32)
where, again, ￿ denotes the market￿ s discount factor from one period to the
next.
By analogy to the static model, we assume that the ability of the time-
t manager a⁄ects both current and future pro￿ts, which in turn implies that
it also matters for the ￿rm￿ s time-t stock market value Pt: This assumption
corresponds to the reasonable idea that a better manager leaves a ￿rm in better
shape when she departs, all else equal￿ i.e., the bene￿ts of her tenure show up
in pro￿ts even after she is gone. In particular, pro￿ts are given by:
￿t = atetqt + at (1 ￿ et) + "s
t + "m
t + at￿1 + ￿("s
t￿1 + "m
t￿1); (33)
where "s
t and "m
t denote the time-t realizations of the sales and margin shocks.
Note that in addition to the carryover of previous-manager ability, sales and
margin shocks continue to be partially persistent. As before, we continue to
assume that pro￿ts can be decomposed into a sales and a margin component,
each of which can be separately observed:10
￿t = st + mt; (34)
where
st = atetqt + "s
t + ￿"s
t￿1 (35)
and
mt = at (1 ￿ et) + at￿1 + "m
t + ￿"m
t￿1: (36)
All random variables are taken to be independent and serially uncorrelated.
Moreover, to simplify the analysis, we assume that, at the beginning of period
t; the past shocks "s
t￿1; and "m
t￿1; as well as the ability at￿1 of the previous
manager, are all publicly revealed. This is a modeling device that makes the
task of forecasting future pro￿ts exactly the same as in the static case. In
particular, the market can now make forecasts based on ￿adjusted values￿of
sales and margins, which factor out at￿1;"s
t￿1and "m
t￿1. That is, the market can
10In this decomposition, we assume that the ability at￿1 of the previous period￿ s manager
in￿uences this period￿ s margins, as opposed to sales.
11create sa
t = atetqt + "s
t, and ma
t = at (1 ￿ et) + "m
t , and use these two variables
to predict next period￿ s pro￿ts.
The timing of events can be described as follows. First, at the beginning
of every period t; the new manager chooses how to allocate her e⁄ort; this,
together with past managerial ability and the realization of current and past
shocks, determines the level of current pro￿ts, sales, and margins. Second,
based on observed sales and margins, and its own prior conjecture as to the
strategy that the ￿rm is following, the market generates a forecast of next
period￿ s pro￿ts, which in turn in￿ uences the stock price Pt. Third, starting
from a given amount qt of un￿lled orders at the beginning of period t; ￿rms￿
strategic choices determine the level of un￿lled orders qt+1 at the beginning of
the subsequent period t+1. And ￿nally, at the beginning of period t+1, past
shocks and past managerial abilities become public information, and the whole
cycle begins again.
We shall focus attention on dynamic self-ful￿lling equilibria which are de￿ned
as sequences of un￿lled orders qt, market conjectures e￿
t, and managerial e⁄ort
allocations et; such that, for all t: (i) given (qt;e￿
t) it is optimal for managers to
choose e⁄ort allocation et; (ii) the allocation et coincides with the market con-
jecture e￿
t; and (iii) qt+1 satis￿es the general version of the transition equation
(30).
3.3 First best
Before proceeding, we consider the ￿rst-best benchmark in two cases. In the
￿rst of these, the demand ￿ ow Qt remains constant over time. In the second,
Qt declines monotonically.
3.3.1 A market with constant demand ￿ ow
Suppose that the demand ￿ ow Qt is simply equal to a constant Q at all times,
and that either ￿ or ￿a are equal to zero, so that managers do not care about
the market. Now, we know from our analysis of the static model that when ￿
or ￿a are equal to zero, managers will be indi⁄erent between the growth and
margins strategies at date t if and only if qt = 1. In the dynamic case, the
question is whether we can sustain a steady-state equilibrium in which qt = 1
for all t, and in which managers devote a ￿xed interior level of e⁄ort ef 2 (0;1)
to growth.
If the manager￿ s e⁄ort allocation is indeed ef, equation (30) tells us that the
dynamics of qt are given by:
qt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿ Aef￿
qt + ￿Q: (37)
This implies a unique steady-state value of qt; namely
qs = ￿Q=
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)Aef￿
: (38)
Therefore, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the interior amount of e⁄ort
to be chosen in all periods is that qs be equal to one. This in turn allows us to
12solve for the ￿rst-best e⁄ort allocation ef; namely:
ef = ￿(Q ￿ 1)=((1 ￿ ￿)A): (39)
It follows that in the ￿rst-best case where managers do not care about im-
pressing the market, a steady-state equilibrium￿ in which growth-related e⁄ort
is given by ef every period, and qt ￿ 1￿ always exists as long as the parameters
￿;Q; and A are such that the right-hand side of (39) lies strictly between zero
and one. Note also that this equilibrium is stable in the sense that starting
from qt > 1, managers will choose the growth strategy so that qt will decrease
towards 1: And similarly, starting from qt < 1; managers will choose the mar-
gins strategy which will make qt increase towards 1. In contrast, we will show
below that when managers do cater to the market, it is in general not possible
to sustain a stable steady-state equilibrium of this sort.
If the parameters are such that the right-hand side of (39) does not lie
between zero and one, we have a corner solution. In particular, if the right-
hand side of (39) exceeds one, this means that the demand ￿ ow is so great that
even under the pure growth strategy, the ￿rm cannot keep up with demand, and
un￿lled orders asymptote to qt = ￿Q=(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)A) > 1. Similarly, if Q < 1,
so that the right-hand size of (39) is negative, the ￿rm plays the pure margins
strategy, and un￿lled orders asymptote to Q.
3.3.2 A market with shrinking demand ￿ ow
It is straightforward to extend the above reasoning to the case where Qt declines
monotonically. Consider the natural analog to (39) with a time-varying e⁄ort
e
f
t :
e
f
t = ￿(Qt ￿ 1)=((1 ￿ ￿)A): (40)
If we start out with a value of Qt such that the right-hand side of (40) exceeds
one, the ￿rm is initially at a corner solution, and plays the all-growth strategy
in which e
f
t = 1. Over time, as Qt falls, the right-hand side of (40) drops
below one, at which point we have an interior solution with the level of e⁄ort
devoted to growth, e
f
t , given by (40). From this point on, the equation tells us
that further declines in Qt lead to matching declines in e
f
t . Eventually, when
Qt drops below one, we hit the other corner, where e
f
t = 0, and the ￿rm plays
the all-margins strategy. The important point here is that if demand shrinks
monotonically, so must the e⁄ort devoted to the growth strategy. As we will
demonstrate below, this need no longer be the case when managers care about
stock prices.
3.4 Excess volatility when managers cater to the market
We now reintroduce a managerial concern with stock prices, and show that this
can lead to endogenous volatility in sales growth. Our reasoning proceeds in two
13steps. First, we consider a given period t and show that Proposition 1 continues
to hold. That is, for the same cut-o⁄ values q￿ and q+ as in the static case:
(i) the unique equilibrium is that ￿rms choose the growth strategy whenever
qt > q+; (ii) the unique equilibrium is that ￿rms choose the margins strategy
whenever qt < q￿; (iii) for q￿ < qt < q+; the two equilibria coexist.
Second, we consider the dynamics of qt and the resulting managerial deci-
sions over time. To do so, we assume that in a dynamic equilibrium the market
maintains the same conjecture as in the previous period whenever there con-
tinues to exist a static equilibrium with that conjecture. Thus, for example,
if qt enters the multiple-equilibrium region (q￿;q+) from above￿ that is, com-
ing from the region qt > q+ where the growth strategy is the unique static
equilibrium￿ then as long as qt remains in that region, the ￿rm and the market
keep playing the growth equilibrium. Or said di⁄erently, whenever there is a
choice of equilibria, we select the one played in the prior period.
3.4.1 Within-period analysis
To understand why the same cut-o⁄ values q￿ and q+ obtain as in the static
model, observe that a ￿rm￿ s market value as of the end of period t can be
expressed as:
Pt = ￿E(at + ￿("s
t + "m
t ) + ￿t+1jsa
t;ma
t;e￿
t); (41)
where ￿t+1 is a function that depends on only those random variables that
are realized from t + 1 onwards. Thus as of period t, the market makes a
conjecture e￿
t about the ￿rm￿ s current choice of strategy, and tries to forecast
exactly the same item as in the static model, namely ￿(at+￿("s
t +"m
t )); period-t
observations of pro￿ts, sales and margins are of no help in forecasting ￿t+1.11
Moreover, given our previous assumptions on information structure, the market
has access to the same two predictive variables as before, sa
t = atetqt + "s
t, and
ma
t = at (1 ￿ et) + "m
t . So the inference problem is completely unchanged.
Similarly, from the perspective of the period-t manager, everything is also
the same, since her utility function is the same as in the static model. Thus
Proposition 1 continues to apply as stated, with the only modi￿cation being
that q0 is replaced everywhere with qt.
3.4.2 Equilibrium selection in the dynamic model
In order to fully pin down the dynamic evolution of qt and et, we need to
specify a mechanism for picking an equilibrium when we are in the parameter
region (q￿;q+) where there are multiple static equilibria. To do so, we make
the following assumption:
11In addition to future realizations of the random variables, ￿t+1 also depends on the
future path of un￿lled orders qt+1, qt+2, etc., which in turn shape future ￿rm strategies et+1,
et+2, etc. But as we will show below, these variables evolve completely deterministically in
equilibrium.
14Assumption A1: If at date t; for a given value of qt; there exist (according
to Proposition 1) multiple static equilibria, the same equilibrium is chosen as in
the previous period.
As noted above, this assumption can be thought of as introducing an element
of history-dependence into the equilibrium-selection criterion.12 Importantly,
the assumption does not require any departure from Bayesian rationality on
the part of either the market or managers. Rather, it follows from imposing
some relatively mild non-common-knowledge structure on the market￿ s higher-
order beliefs out of equilibrium. In particular, Assumption A1 would be implied
by the following higher-order beliefs. Suppose that the market believes that
managers believe that the market is inertial in its conjectures￿ in other words,
the market believes that managers believe that the market always maintains the
same conjecture about managers￿strategies as in the prior period. And suppose
further that managers understand that the market has such beliefs about them.
This will lead both sides to coordinate on the equilibrium-selection criterion we
have assumed. Moreover, neither side￿ s beliefs will ever be contradicted along
the path of play.13
3.4.3 Deterministic cycles with constant demand ￿ ow
With all the pieces now in place, let us return to the case where the demand
￿ ow Qt is equal to a constant Q. We can now state our central result:
Proposition 2 Under Assumption A1, with Qt constant, and with ￿ and ￿a
both positive, we have that: (i) there no longer exists a stable stationary equilib-
rium in which managers allocate a positive and time-invariant amount of e⁄ort
to both growth and margins, except for possibly on a zero-measure subset of
parameters; (ii) there exists a subset of parameters with positive measure, for
which one can construct a cyclical equilibrium. In this cyclical equilibrium, the
￿rm switches back and forth between the growth and margins regimes at regular
intervals, and the level of un￿lled orders qt ￿uctuates within a range bounded by
two extreme values q > q+ and q < q￿:
12Rajan (1994) makes an identical assumption in a model with a similar dynamic structure.
13Several readers have suggested another equilibrium-selection criterion: if at date t, there
exist multiple equilibria, the incumbent manager simply announces which strategy she in-
tends to pursue, and the market believes her. At ￿rst glance, it might appear that this
mechanism would allow for an approximately e¢ cient outcome in which the growth strategy
is played whenever qt > 1, and the margins strategy is played whenever qt < 1. However,
this conclusion does not hold if we perturb the model slightly so that the manager has pri-
vate information about the upcoming realizations of the sales and margins shocks, "s
t and "m
t .
(This perturbation does not a⁄ect our results at all if we continue to disregard announcements
by the manager.) To see why, suppose that the market believes the manager￿ s announce-
ments, and that within each equilibrium, the updating rules continue to be given as before.
Now consider a situation where qt < 1￿ so that it is e¢ cient for the manager to announce
the margins strategy￿ but where the manager anticipates a large positive sales shock. The
manager will prefer to announce the growth strategy, because she wants to get more credit
for a strong showing on the sales dimension. Thus e¢ cient equilibrium selection is not in
general attainable via a mechanism that relies on managerial announcements, because of the
opportunistic nature of these announcements with respect to managers￿private information.
15Proof: Part (i) of Proposition 2 is proven in the appendix. Here, we just
establish part (ii); this part of the proof is briefer and captures most of the
important intuition. Let qg and qm denote the ￿xed points of the dynamic
equations (28) and (29), i.e., the steady-state values of qt in the all-growth and
all-margins regimes, respectively. We have already noted that:
qg = ￿Q=(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)A) (42)
and:
qm = Q: (43)
Then, a su¢ cient condition for the existence of endogenous cycles is simply that:
qg < q￿ and qm > q+: (44)
To see why, suppose that at some date t; un￿lled orders qt lie in the interval
(qg;q￿): Then, the unique static equilibrium is for managers to play the margins
strategy. But then Assumption A1 implies that the market will maintain the
margins conjecture, and managers will continue to ful￿ll that conjecture, until
qt crosses the threshold q+. This crossing will necessarily occur in ￿nite time,
since qm > q+: When the threshold is crossed, the margins strategy will cease
to be an equilibrium and the ￿rm will switch to the growth strategy. Once the
growth strategy is in place, qt will begin to decline, heading towards qg. Now,
since qg < q￿, the sequence qt will cross the threshold q￿ in ￿nite time, which in
turn brings us back to the situation where we started￿ i.e., where qt belongs to
the interval (qg;q￿) and where the margins strategy is the unique equilibrium.
This establishes part (ii) of the proposition. It also should be pointed out
that, since q￿ and q+ are independent of Q and A; the above condition (44)
is easily satis￿ed if ￿ is small relative to A and Q, because in this case, qg
is approximately equal to ￿Q=A, which can be made arbitrarily small, while
qm = Q, which can independently be made large.
Figure 1 provides an illustration of deterministic cycles with constant de-
mand ￿ ow. We choose the following baseline parameter values: Q = 2, ￿ = 0:1,
A = 0:5, ￿a = ￿s = ￿m = 1, ￿ = 0:1, and ￿ = 1. We then solve the model
forward over 100 periods, for each of three values of ￿: (i) ￿ = 0 (i.e., the ￿rst-
best case); (ii) ￿ = 1:0 ; and (iii) ￿ = 1:5. In each case, we plot the evolution
of qt over time.
In the ￿rst-best case, qt starts out at a value of 0:2, so we are initially in the
margins regime. The low level of output associated with the margins strategy
causes qt to rise. When qt hits one, the ￿rm switches to an interior level of
e⁄ort given by (39). From this point onward, the ￿rm is in steady state, with
ef = 0:22, and qt ￿xed at one.
Moving to the catering-to-the-market case when ￿ = 1:0, we have that
q￿ = 0:71, and q+ = 1:41. Thus the ￿rm stays with the margins strategy￿
and qt keeps increasing￿ for longer than in the ￿rst-best, until qt crosses 1:41.
At this point, the ￿rm switches to the growth strategy, which drives qt sharply
16downward. When qt falls below 0:71, the ￿rm goes back to the margins strategy,
and the cycle starts over again.
Things are qualitatively similar with ￿ = 1:5. However, we now have
that q￿ = 0:64, and q+ = 1:59, i.e., the size of the multiple-equilibrium range
has increased. This leads to more pronounced overshooting, and hence to a
smaller number of cycles, with each cycle being of larger amplitude. Consider
in particular the ￿rst switch point. With ￿ = 1:5, the ￿rm stays with the
margins strategy longer, until qt crosses 1:59. Thus the ￿rst transition to the
growth strategy is delayed, coming at t = 14, rather than at t = 11, as in the
case where ￿ = 1:0. The bottom line is that the increase in ￿ results in qt
being on average further away from the ￿rst-best value of one. The natural
interpretation is that a more intense managerial focus on current stock prices
has negative consequences for economic e¢ ciency.
FIGURE 1 HERE
3.4.4 Non-monotonic adjustment with shrinking demand ￿ ow
The other case of interest is the one where the demand ￿ ow declines monotoni-
cally over time. As seen above, in the ￿rst-best this decline in demand ￿ ow is
matched by a monotonic reduction in the e⁄ort devoted to the growth strategy.
The goal here is to show that when managers cater to the stock market, the
adjustment of growth-related e⁄ort￿ and hence of qt￿ can be non-monotonic.
The mechanism is very similar to that which generates cycles in the constant-
Q case. For the sake of concreteness, suppose that the demand ￿ ow Qt declines
geometrically over time, that is:
Qt = Q0￿
t; (45)
with 0 < ￿ < 1: Moreover, let Q0 be large, so that the ￿rm starts out in the
growth regime. In this regime, the dynamics of qt are given by:
qt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ A)qt + ￿Q0￿
t: (46)
According to (46), qt will eventually start declining. Moreover, by Assump-
tion A1, the ￿rm will stay in the growth regime past the point where qt drops
below one, until qt passes through q￿. (Recall, by contrast, that in the ￿rst-
best, the ￿rm transitions to an interior level of e⁄ort as soon as qt reaches one.)
Once q￿ has been breached, the ￿rm will switch to the margins regime, where
the dynamics of of qt are given by:
qt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)qt + ￿Q0￿
t: (47)
Because the e⁄ort devoted to growth has been cut by a discrete amount, it
is possible that qt will now start rising, in spite of the general downward drag
17from the shrinking demand ￿ ow. Indeed, qt may well cross back above q+,
leading the ￿rm to switch back to the growth regime once again.
Of course, in the long run, qt will always converge to zero (since the demand
￿ ow Qt is going to zero), and the ￿rm will wind up absorbed in the margins
regime. But what is interesting relative to the ￿rst-best case is that this con-
vergence need not be monotonic. Indeed, it can in principle involve a number
of transitions back and forth between the growth and margin regimes, with
corresponding ￿ uctuations in the value of qt.
Figure 2 illustrates this phenomenon of non-monotonic convergence. We set
Q0 = 20, ￿ = 0:9, ￿ = 0:1, A = 0:5, ￿a = ￿s = ￿m = 1, ￿ = 0:1, and ￿ = 1.
We then plot the evolution of qt in two cases: (i) the ￿rst-best case where ￿ = 0;
and (ii) ￿ = 1:0.
In the ￿rst-best case, qt starts out at a value of 2:0, so we are initially in
the growth regime. In spite of this fact, the demand ￿ ow is so high in the early
periods that qt continues to increase, reaching a peak value of 3:2 at t = 3.
From this point on, the level of output associated with the growth strategy is
enough to overwhelm the now-smaller demand ￿ ow, so qt begins to fall. When
qt hits one, which happens at t = 14, the ￿rm switches to an interior level
of e⁄ort given by (40). This e⁄ort level declines gradually over time, and qt
remains ￿xed at one, until t = 30. From this point onward, the demand ￿ ow
is too low for an interior e⁄ort level to be viable. Therefore the ￿rm moves to
the pure margins strategy, and qt declines toward zero.
In the second-best case, with ￿ = 1:0, we have as before that q￿ = 0:71,
and q+ = 1:41. Everything works the same as in the ￿rst-best case during the
early periods￿ the ￿rm plays the growth strategy, and qt ￿rst rises, then begins
to fall. However, the two cases diverge when qt reaches one. Rather than
moving to an interior e⁄ort level, the ￿rm stays with the growth strategy for
longer, until qt drops below 0:71, which happens when t = 18. At this point,
the ￿rm switches to the margins strategy. Demand ￿ ow is still strong enough
that this switch leads qt to begin increasing. When qt rises above 1:41, the ￿rm
goes back to the growth strategy, and qt starts falling again. As it turns out,
this second growth episode is the last one; the next time that the ￿rm returns to
the margins strategy, demand ￿ ow has abated to the point where qt never again
reaches q+. Thus overall, the ￿rm starts with growth, switches to margins,
goes back to growth, all before settling permanently into the margins strategy.
FIGURE 2 HERE
3.5 Behavioral variations
3.5.1 Investors use simple models
So far we have taken stock-market investors to be fully rational￿ i.e., able to
form Bayesian forecasts based on all observed variables. In what follows, we
brie￿ y explore the consequences of a simple form of bounded rationality. In
particular, we suppose that there is a representative investor who can only run
18univariate regressions.14 Since optimal forecasting in our setting requires the
use of bivariate regressions, this is a meaningful limitation. In all other respects,
however, the representative investor is completely rational. His univariate fore-
casts are unbiased, and in any given equilibrium (growth or margins) he picks
the single variable that minimizes the variance of forecast errors.
In principle, the single most powerful forecasting variable for next period￿ s
pro￿ts can be either: i) current pro￿ts; ii) current sales; or iii) current margins,
depending on the equilibrium that we are in. So to solve the general case, we
would have to compute the forecast errors associated with each of these three
variables, across both the growth and margins regimes. To keep things simple,
we focus on an extreme but illustrative case, where the persistence coe¢ cient
￿ is small but non-zero. We ￿rst revisit the static model, and then sketch the
dynamic implications.
In the context of the static model, it is easy to see that when ￿ is positive but
small, the best predictor of ￿1 in the growth regime is s0, and the best predictor
of ￿1 in the margins regime is m0. Moreover, since s0 and m0 are uncorrelated,
the optimal univariate regression coe¢ cients ￿
sg and ￿
mm are exactly the same
as given before. All that changes is that ￿
mg and ￿
sm are now e⁄ectively set to
zero, as opposed to their previous values of ￿ in the fully rational case. In other
words, in the growth regime the representative investor focuses only on sales,
and gives it the same weight as before, while completely ignoring margins, with
the reverse being true in the margins regime.
As in Section 2, we can calculate cut-o⁄ values of q0 that de￿ne the regions
over which the growth and margins equilibria can exist. Denoting these revised
cuto⁄s by q
￿
b and that q
+
b , we have that q
￿
b solves:
q = 1 ￿ ￿￿
q2￿a + ￿q￿s
q2￿a + ￿s : (48)
This equation is almost identical to its counterpart (21) in the rational case,
except that the term (￿￿￿￿) on the left-hand side of that equation has now
disappeared. It follows immediately that:
q
￿
b < q￿: (49)
Similarly, q
+
b satis￿es:
q = 1 + ￿￿
￿a + ￿￿m
￿a + ￿m : (50)
This equation also looks like its counterpart (25) in the rational case, except for
the term (￿￿￿q) which has disappeared from the left hand side. This in turn
yields:
q
+
b > q+: (51)
14This assumption can be motivated by the observation that investors tend to simplify
the world around them, and hence do not use all available sources of information in making
their forecasts. See Hong and Stein (2004) for an extensive discussion, and references to the
relevant psychology literature.
19Thus for the static model, introducing the bounded-rationality feature en-
larges the multiple-equilibrium region, from (q￿;q+) to (q
￿
b ;q
+
b ). There is a
very natural intuition for this result. Suppose we are currently in a growth equi-
librium. With bounded rationality, the market pays attention to sales as before,
but now completely ignores margins. Thus for a manager who contemplates
deviating from the growth strategy to the margins strategy, the prospective hit
to her stock price is more severe than before￿ the market will penalize her for the
reduction in sales, but will give her no credit whatsoever for the improvement
in margins. As a result, she is more inclined to simply continue playing the
growth strategy. Similarly, if we start o⁄in a margins equilibrium, the manager
will again be very reluctant to deviate to a growth strategy.
Notice that introducing bounded rationality has an e⁄ect that is isomorphic
to increasing the parameter ￿, which measures how intensely managers care
about the current stock price. In the former case, the potential for multiple
equilibria goes up because there is a bigger stock-price penalty for bucking the
expectations of a naive market; in the latter case, the potential for multiple
equilibria goes up because managers are less willing to tolerate a stock-price
penalty of any given size.
When we move to the dynamic setting, everything continues to work exactly
as before, except that we now use the new cut-o⁄ values q
￿
b and q
+
b in place of
their rational counterparts q￿ and q+. This implies that whenever the conditions
of Proposition 2 are satis￿ed, and a cyclical equilibrium exists, the magnitude of
the ￿ uctuations is greater than before, in much the same way as an increase in ￿
leads to more extreme ￿ uctuations. Again, this is because once entrenched in a
given regime, managers are more reluctant than before to change strategies. As
a result, they play any given strategy longer, which leads to more pronounced
overshooting of qt.
Figure 3 illustrates the contrast between the rational and bounded-rationality
cases. We return to a constant-demand-￿ ow environment, and set Q = 2,
￿ = 0:1, A = 0:5, ￿a = ￿s = ￿m = 1, ￿ = 0:1, ￿ = 1, and ￿ = 1. We
then trace out the evolution of qt for both cases. The plot corresponding to
the fully-rational case is actually identical to the one for ￿ = 1 in Figure 1;
all the other parameter values are the same, and so we again have q￿ = 0:71,
and q+ = 1:41. With bounded rationality, q
￿
b = 0:65 , and q
+
b = 1:55; these
are almost the same cuto⁄s that we obtained under full rationality in Figure 1
by setting ￿ = 1:5. So not surprisingly, we get essentially the same outcome:
cycles are of both longer duration and greater amplitude, and on average, qt is
farther away from the ￿rst-best value of one.
FIGURE 3 HERE
3.5.2 Investors treat stocks in the same category similarly
Another potentially interesting extension of our model￿ which we do not pursue
formally here￿ ￿ ows from the observation of Barberis and Shleifer (2003) that
20investors tend to place stocks into broad categories, and to think about stocks
within a given category in a similar way (see also Mullainathan (2002)). In our
context, this might mean using the same pricing rule (based on either a growth
conjecture or a margins conjecture) to value all ￿rms in a category at a given
point in time. For example, it might be that during the dot-com boom, investors
lumped all internet retailers into a category, and used the same growth-oriented
pricing rule to value all of them.
In such an environment, the behavior of any one ￿rm can have interesting
spillovers onto other ￿rms in the same category. If Amazon.com initially has
very strong growth prospects, and winds up entrenched in the growth equilib-
rium, this might force other internet retailers into pursuing a growth strategy
as well, because they know they will be evaluated by the market based on the
pricing rule from the growth equilibrium.
4 Empirical Implications
We now turn to the model￿ s empirical content. First, we discuss the implications
that ￿ ow from the version with fully rational investors. Next, we brie￿ y touch
on the extra predictions that arise when bounded rationality is added to the
mix.
4.1 The model with rational investors
Unlike most of the literature on the stock market and real activity, our theory￿ s
primary focus is not on how the level of stock prices in￿ uences real variables.
That is, we have little to say regarding the textbook Q-theoretic prediction that
a ￿rm￿ s investment and sales growth will be higher when its stock price is high
(Tobin (1969)). Instead, what matters in our framework is the market￿ s pricing
rule￿ i.e., the sensitivity of stock prices to observable variables such as sales and
pro￿t margins. Thus our central implication is that a ￿rm￿ s investment and
sales growth will be higher when its stock price is more sensitive to growth-
oriented metrics. And conversely, a ￿rm￿ s investment and sales growth will
be lower￿ and pro￿t margins higher￿ when its stock price is more sensitive to
measures of costs and margins. Moreover, a subsidiary prediction is that these
basic e⁄ects will be more pronounced in those ￿rms where managers have high-
powered incentives to maximize short-term stock prices.
How might one operationalize tests of these hypotheses? Although a com-
plete treatment of this question is beyond the scope of the paper, we can o⁄er
a few tentative thoughts. First, one might use cross-sectional regressions to
estimate the sensitivity of stock prices to di⁄erent variables at a given point in
time. To be more speci￿c, imagine that for industry i at time t, we take all
the existing ￿rms, and run a cross-sectional regression of each ￿rm￿ s market-to-
book ratio against: (i) some measure of its growth-related performance (e.g.,
21sales growth over the prior year); and (ii) some measure of its per-unit prof-
itability (e.g., its gross margin). The coe¢ cient on the former variable would
then be the ￿growth beta￿for industry i at time t, and the coe¢ cient on the
latter variable would be the ￿margins beta￿ .
The next step would be to relate changes in these growth and margins betas
over time to changes in the nature of ￿rm performance. In particular, one could
ask whether, e.g., investment is on average higher for ￿rms in industry i at those
times when the industry￿ s growth beta is larger. And with the appropriate
data on managerial incentives, one could further check to see if this relationship
is more pronounced in the subset of ￿rms where managers have a lot of stock
or options that can be sold in the near future.
We are unaware of any empirical work that explores these questions. How-
ever, we should mention a pair of recent papers by Baker and Wurgler (2004a,
2004b) that share a similar spirit. Baker and Wurgler develop a catering theory
of dividends, and provide the following evidence in favor of it. First, they cal-
culate at any point in time a ￿dividend premium￿ , de￿ned as the di⁄erence in
the average market-to-book ratio of dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying
￿rms. They then show that variation over time in this dividend premium helps
to explain ￿rms￿choices of dividend policy: ￿rms are signi￿cantly more likely to
initiate dividend payments when the dividend premium is high. While Baker
and Wurgler￿ s interest is in a ￿nancial, rather than real variable (i.e., dividends,
as opposed to sales growth or investment), the structure of their tests is closely
analogous to what we propose above. That is, they estimate the point-in-time
sensitivity of stock prices to a particular ￿rm attribute using cross-sectional
comparisons, and then show that managers￿apparent willingness to deliver this
attribute is greater when the market values it more highly.15
4.2 Consequences of bounded rationality
The fully-rational version of the model has nothing to say about expected
stock returns￿ they are simply constant over time. In contrast, the bounded-
rationality version of the model makes a novel and relatively subtle prediction.
When we are in a growth equilibrium, the market fully impounds all growth-
related information, but ignores margins-related information. This implies that
in a growth equilibrium, ￿rms with strong pro￿t margins will be undervalued,
and have high expected returns, while ￿rms with weak pro￿t margins will be
overvalued, and have low expected returns. Conversely, in a margins equi-
librium, the market takes account of margins-related information, but under-
weights growth-related information. So ￿rms with strong growth performance
will have high expected returns, and ￿rms with weak growth performance will
have low expected returns.
15One distinction between our work and Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b) is that they in-
tepret the time-variation in the market￿ s sensitivity to dividends as a manifestation of investor
irrationality. In contrast, we have emphasized that time-variation in the market￿ s sensitivity
to measures of growth and margins can be part of a fully rational equilibrium.
22The key insight is that neither attribute￿ growth or margins￿ will be system-
atically mispriced at all times. Rather, there will be time-variation in the
nature of cross-sectional return predictability. For example, sometimes a trad-
ing strategy of buying high-margin ￿rms and shorting low-margin ones will work
well, and at other times it will work less well. Moreover, the theory tell us pre-
cisely when the strategy should be expected to work best: when the industry in
question is in a high-growth regime.
Again, we do not know of any work that can be thought of as a systematic
test of this hypothesis. Perhaps the closest bit of evidence comes from Baker
and Wurgler (2004c). They too are interested in the general idea of time-
variation in the cross-section of expected stock returns, and they examine how
the predictive content of di⁄erent ￿rm characteristics for stock returns varies
with proxies for the overall level of investor sentiment. One of their ￿ndings
is that: (i) when investor sentiment is relatively high, unpro￿table ￿rms have
lower expected returns than pro￿table ￿rms; but (ii) when investor sentiment
is relatively low, this pattern reverses itself, so that unpro￿table ￿rms have
higher expected returns. If one thinks of investor sentiment as being positively
correlated with economy-wide growth prospects, this ￿nding can be seen as
￿tting nicely with the predictions of our theory.
5 Related Work
Our model relates to several distinct branches of literature. One of these, which
we discussed brie￿ y in the Introduction, considers the impact of investor senti-
ment and stock-market mispricing on corporate investment. As noted above,
our model di⁄ers from this work in that we do not require any irrationality on
the part of investors to generate our principal results (though the model can,
as we have argued, accommodate such irrationality). Moreover, in our set-
ting, variation in the market￿ s pricing rule is endogenous￿ there is no analog to
exogenous, noise-trader-induced sentiment shocks.
Another prominent theme in corporate ￿nance has to do with the conse-
quences of managerial ￿short-termism￿ . Work in this area (Narayanan (1985),
Stein (1989), Bebchuk and Stole (1993)) has tended to emphasize a relatively
static set of ine¢ ciencies that arise when, in a world of asymmetric informa-
tion, managers are concerned with maximizing current stock prices instead of
long-run value. For example, if the stock market focuses exclusively on reported
earnings, short-term-oriented managers will take various steps to pump up earn-
ings, either via accounting manipulations, or through real-side distortions such
as cuts in maintenance expenditures, changes in pricing policies designed to
bring forward current sales at the expense of future sales, and so forth.
By contrast with this work, our premise is that the market makes inferences
about ￿rm value based on multiple variables (i.e., both growth and pro￿tability
measures) rather than just earnings. This leads to the potential for a broader
set of outcomes than in models of earnings hyping; for example, ￿rms may
sometimes invest too much, when they are playing the growth strategy. And
23importantly, multivariate learning generates a more dynamic account of ￿rm
behavior, whereby the nature of the distortion varies over time along with the
market￿ s approach to valuation.
The one paper in the short-termism/learning genre that is closest to ours is
Rajan￿ s (1994) account of bank credit cycles. Like we do, Rajan considers the
possibility that there will be time-variation in how the market makes inferences
about managerial ability. In particular, if a bank reports poor performance due
to loan losses, it will tend to be evaluated harshly by the market, unless many
other banks are also su⁄ering loan losses at the same time, in which case the
market will blame a systematic shock. This mechanism can lead to cycles in
which banks roll over bad loans for several periods in order hide their losses, and
then, when the buildup of bad loans reaches a critical point, they coordinate
and all switch to a strategy of loss recognition and credit contraction. This is
similar in many ways to our story. Perhaps the most noteworthy di⁄erence is
that in Rajan￿ s model, the dynamics of learning are driven by a benchmarking
externality across banks. That is, there need to be several similar banks, and
the market must base its evaluation of bank i in part on the performance of
bank j. In our model, on the other hand, each ￿rm is evaluated by the market
based solely on its own performance.
Within the large literature on macroeconomic ￿ uctuations, we are probably
closest to the work on endogenous business cycles.16 This research shows that
purely intrinsic cycles can arise from a variety of other sources beyond those
considered here: (i) the existence of non-linearities as in Grandmont (1985);
(ii) price or wage rigidities which lead to a multiplier-accelerator mechanism as
in Goodwin (1951); or (iii) pecuniary externalities combined with credit con-
straints, as in Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999). Also related is Shleifer
(1986), who shows that endogenous cycles can be driven by each ￿rm￿ s desire
to coordinate the timing of its investments with that of other ￿rms. As with
Rajan (1994), Shleifer￿ s model is thus fundamentally about strategic interaction
across ￿rms, whereas ours is about the interplay between a single ￿rm and the
stock market.17
6 Conclusions
The basic message of this paper can be simply stated. A desire on the part of
managers to please the stock market can introduce signi￿cant excess volatility
16The work on endogenous business cycles can be contrasted with the real-business cycle
(RBC) approach pioneered by Kydland and Prescott (1982), as well as with models based on
￿sunspots￿ or ￿animal spirits￿ (e.g., Woodford (1990), Howitt and McAfee (1992)). In the
RBC framework, ￿uctuations result from exogeneous shocks to, e.g., demand or technology.
In sunspot models, extrinsic variables also play a key role, namely that of coordinating agents￿
expectations.
17Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) embed Shleifer￿ s (1986) implementation cycles into a full-
￿edged Schumpeterian framework in which both R&D activities and implementation decisions
are endogenous. This means that, as in our model, ￿rms have to divide their e⁄orts between
two tasks￿ in their case, R&D and production.
24into real variables such as output and sales, even if the market itself is fully
e¢ cient. This conclusion di⁄ers from the premise implicit in much recent re-
search in behavioral ￿nance￿ that the stock market can only exert a destabilizing
in￿ uence on real activity to the extent that it is subject to non-fundamental sen-
timent shocks. Our theory makes a number of distinctive empirical predictions,
which we hope to explore in future empirical work.
257 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2, Part (i): Suppose, hypothetically, that there
exists a stationary equilibrium in which managers devote the same interior level
of e⁄ort eh to the growth strategy in all periods. In this case, the steady-state
value of qt is given by:
qh = ￿Q=
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)Aeh￿
; (52)
In order for managers to be willing to allocate an interior level of e⁄ort,
it must be that they do not gain by deviating to either the all-growth or the
all-margins strategies. Using arguments similar to those in Section 2 above,
this condition can be shown to imply:
qh =
1 + ￿￿￿
mh
1 + ￿￿￿
sh (53)
where ￿
mh and ￿
sh are the regression coe¢ cients that the market uses to fore-
cast future pro￿ts based on observed margins and sales respectively, given a
conjectured e⁄ort allocation equal to the hypothesized value of eh. Intuitively,
the larger is ￿
mh relative to ￿
sh, the more weight the market puts on margins
relative to sales in the hypothesized equilibrium, and hence the larger must be
the size of the market qh to deter managers from deviating to the all-margins
strategy.
The regression coe¢ cients ￿
mh and ￿
sh are both functions of eh. In partic-
ular, we have that:
￿
mh = ((1 ￿ eh)va + ￿vm)=
￿
(1 ￿ eh)2va + vm￿
: (54)
and:
￿
sh = (ehqhva + ￿vs)=
￿
(ehqh)2va + vs￿
: (55)
Using these expressions for ￿
mh and ￿
sh, it can be shown that (53) implies
the restriction that q￿ < qh < q+. In other words, to support an interior level
of e⁄ort, qh must lie inside the range where the static model admits multiple
equilibria.
If there is to be a stationary equilibrium, (52) and (53) must both be satis￿ed,
which gives us two equations in terms of the two unknowns, qh and eh, as well
as various other parameters of the model. However, even if there is a solution
to these two equations with an interior value of eh, the resulting stationary
equilibrium will not in general be stable.
To see why, suppose that we perturb qt slightly away from qh. At this point,
there can no longer be a static equilibrium with interior e⁄ort. Suppose that
the all-growth equilibrium is chosen instead. Then by Assumption A1, we know
that the growth equilibrium will be maintained as long as qt remains above q￿.
This in turn implies that qt will decline over time until either: i) it hits q￿; or
26ii) it asymptotes to qg. Given that q￿ < qh, the only way for qt to converge
back to the equilibrium value of qh is if:
qh = qg: (56)
Thus for the hypothesized stationary equilibrium to not only exist, but be
stable, we require that (52), (53), and (56) all hold. This is an overdetermined
system￿ there are three equations, and only two unknowns, qh and eh. As a
result, a stable stationary equilibrium can only occur on a zero-measure subset
of the parameter space. This establishes part (i) of the proposition. As an
aside, note that this stability problem does not arise when ￿ = 0. In this case
q￿ = qh = 1, which means that after a perturbation away from the stationary
state to the growth equilibrium, we are eventually pushed back to exactly the
point where the interior-e⁄ort stationary equilibrium is viable.
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30Figure 1: Deterministic Cycles With Constant Demand Flow
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